Recent Developments: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: The Demise of the Public Use Doctrine by Drechsler, Thomas J.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 16
Number 3 Spring, 1986 Article 9
1986
Recent Developments: Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: The Demise of
the Public Use Doctrine
Thomas J. Drechsler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drechsler, Thomas J. (1986) "Recent Developments: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: The Demise of
the Public Use Doctrine," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 16 : No. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol16/iss3/9
death shall be brought within three years 
after the death of the injured person. 
The appellants argued that where the 
decedent died not knowing that he was a 
victim of a wrong and that the wrong had 
caused his demise, the beneficiaries should 
have up to three years from the time they 
knew or should have known the cause of 
death, within which to bring an action for 
wrongful death. Just such a discovery rule 
was established in Harig v. Johns-Manville 
Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 
(1978), a latent disease case. 
The Trimper court distinguished the 
Harig case from Trimper, as the former 
was brought under MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. §5-l0l (1984) 
which is the general statute oflimitations 
and which provides that an action shall be 
filed within three years from the date of ac-
crual of the cause of action. The court in 
Harig defined "accrual" as when a plain-
tiff, "ascertains or through the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence should have 
ascertained the nature and cause of his in-
jury." 284 Md. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306. 
The court's definition of accrual was re-
stricted to latent disease cases. 
The Trimper court contended that prec-
edent precluded the court from applying a 
discovery rule to wrongful death actions. 
The rule in Maryland is, that since 
the wrongful death statute created a 
new liability not existing at common 
law, compliance with the period of 
limitations for such actions is a condi-
tion precedent to the right to maintain 
the action. The period oflimitations is 
part of the substantive right of action. 
305 Md. at 35, citing State v. Zitomer, 275 
Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976), citing 
Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 266 
Md. 52, 55-56, 291 A.2d 452, 454 (1972); 
Dunnigan v. Coburn, 171 Md. 23, 25-26, 
187 A. 881, 884 (1936); and State v. Parks, 
148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793, 795 
(1925). 
The legislative intent behind the crea-
tion of the wrongful death statute is abso-
lutely clear and "there is no room for judi-
cial interpretation." Trimper, 305 Md. 
at 36. 
Conversely, the survival statutes do not 
create a new cause of action unknown to 
common law, but merely alter the com-
mon law under which certain actions may 
be brought on behalf of decedents. The 
statute provides that a cause of action at 
law, except slander, survives the death of 
either party. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §6-401(a) (1984). Limita-
tions on survival actions are provided by 
the general statute of limitations. 
Appellants, as personal representatives, 
relying on Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 
631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), which estab-
lished discovery as the general test for ac-
crual, argued to the court that the survival 
claims did not accrue until each woman 
knew or should have known of the condi-
tion between her husband's exposure to as-
bestos and the resulting diseases suffered 
by the decedents. 
In response to this argument, appellees 
argued that if no cause of action accrued 
until it was discovered after the decedents' 
respective deaths, then the decedents had 
no cause of action at the time of death and 
therefore no action may be brought on be-
half of the decedents under the survival 
statutes. 
The court distinguished Poffenberger 
from the case at bar in that the former 
never dealt with an injured person who 
subsequently died either from the injury 
complained of or from other causes with-
out having instituted a right of action for 
the injury. Rather, Poffenberger focused 
upon the injured person who discovered 
the wrong inflicted upon him while living 
but after the prescribed three years had ex-
pired. 
The court also rejected appellees' argu-
ment that appellants' claims necessarily fail 
if a discovery rule is applied. An injured 
party need not know that he has suffered 
a legally recognized wrong which has re-
sulted in harm in order to have a complete 
cause of action. The court further con-
tended that the discovery rule limits the 
period of time in which an injured plaintiff 
may bring an action for the wrong commit-
ted, "but it does not change the time when 
a cause of action becomes conceptually 
complete." Trimper, 305 Md. at 42. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the decedents 
in these cases have a cause of action which 
survive their deaths. The court then turned 
to the question of how long the causes of 
action exist. 
Upon considering a series of case law 
dealing with statutory time bars to wrong-
ful death and survival actions, from which 
no general principle regarding the same 
could be drawn, the court held that sur-
vival actions must be brought within three 
years of the discovery of a link between the 
fatal disease and the exposure to asbestos. 
The court explicitly limited the application 
of the Qiscovery rule in survival actions to 
latent disease cases which are instituted 
initially as survival actions rather than 
wrongful death actions. The court sup-
ported its decision by referring to the 
workers compensation statute dealing spe-
cifically with latent occupational diseases. 
The statute contains a provision whereby 
an action for disability or death from pul-
monary dust disease must be brought 
within three years from the date of disable-
ment or death or the date on which the em-
ployee or his dependent discovered the link 
between the disablement or death and his 
employment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, 
§26(a)(4) (1985). 
Thus considering the legislative intent 
of the wrongful death statute, the discovery 
rule established in Harig, and the workers 
compensation statute, the Trimper court 
concluded that in situations involving the 
latent development of disease, a cause of 
action accrues either when a person discov-
ers or reasonably should have discovered 
the nature and cause of the injury, or at 
death whichever first occurs. Judgments 
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
were affirmed. 
- Patricia Dart Brooks 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore 
v.lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: THE 
DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC USE 
DOCTRINE 
In 1982, California acknowledged a sov-
ereign's latent power to condemn a profes-
sional sports franchise through eminent do-
main. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 
32 Cal. 3d 60,183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 
835 (1982). Recently in Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore v. Indianapolis Colts, 
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D.Md. 1985), the 
City of Baltimore sought to test this power 
in an attempt to enjoin the Colts football 
franchise from relocating to Indianapolis. 
Prompted by ailing negotiations between 
the City and Colt's owner Robert Irsay, 
the Maryland Senate on March 27, 1984 
passed emergency legislation authorizing 
the City of Baltimore to condemn the Colt's 
NFL franchise. In response, Mr. Irsay im-
mediately began shipping all of the team's 
physical possessions to Indianapolis. Crews 
worked throughout the night of March 28, 
and by early morning the loaded May-
flower vans had left Maryland. 
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland Leg-
islature finalized Emergency Bill No. 1042, 
1984 Md. Laws Ch. 6. Emergency Ordi-
nance No. 32 was thereafter enacted by the 
city authorizing the condemnation of sport 
franchises. A condemnation petition was 
immediately filed in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City seeking to acquire the Colts 
by eminent domain. On April 2, 1984 the 
Colts removed the case to the federal district 
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 
The law of eminent domain authorizes a 
sovereign to take property for public use 
without the owner's consent upon making 
just compensation. Nichol's on Eminent 
Domain (3rd ed. 1980) §1.l1 pp. 1-10. 
The majority of the case law defining the 
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parameters of this power involve a state's 
condemnation of tangible property to sup-
port traditional and limited public purposes 
such as the construction and maintenance 
of streets and highways. It is not disputed, 
however, that this power extends to encom-
pass property of every kind and character. 
26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §73 
p.733. 
The unique character of this area of the 
law demands that the power exercised "be 
exclusive of another state's power to con-
demn the same property." Nichols on Em-
inent Domain §2.l2. Therefore, acquiring 
the Colts through eminent domain re-
quired that the club be located within 
Maryland at the time condemnation takes 
place. 
The city's argument was two-fold. First, 
although the franchise had long since 
moved to Indianapolis, they contended 
that the appropriate time to determine the 
situs of the club was March 30, 1984, the 
date the condemnation petition was filed. 
Conceding that the team's physical assets 
were not in Maryland on that date, the city 
next asserted that the club's "lingering 
contacts" with Maryland were enough to 
give the city the power to condemn. Colts, 
624 F. Supp. at 282. 
Thus two major questions were presented 
to the court: (1) What is the relevant date 
to determine the location of the club? and 
(2) What standard is the appropriate test 
for determining the situs of intangibles? 
The Colts contended that the situs of 
property is determined by the date com-
pensation is paid for the property. Article 
III §40 of the Maryland Constitution pro-
vides: "The General Assembly shall enact 
no law authorizing private property to be 
taken for public use without just com-
pensation .... being first paid .... " See 
also MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-102(2), 108 (1981). Further support 
for the Colt's position is found in Wash-
ington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. 
Nash, 284 Md. 376, 396 A.2d 538 (1979). 
In Nash the court of appeals held that a 
condemning authority may not interfere 
with an owner's right to use and dispose of 
his property until it has paid for the prop-
erty.Id. 
The city urged the court to adopt a vari-
ation of the "relations back doctrine" ap-
plied in City of Crystal Lake v. LaSalle 
National Bank, 121 Ill. App. 3d 346, 459 
N.E. 2d 643 (1984) and San Bernardino 
Valley Municipal Water District v. Gage 
Canal Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 206, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 856 (1964). Under this doctrine title 
does not vest until the condemnor pays just 
compensation, but when payment is made, 
the title relates back to the date of the filing 
of the condemnation petition. Normally, 
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this rule is applied to tax liens or other 
rights and obligations which have accrued 
after filing. These cases, however, extend 
the doctrine to resolve competing claims 
for condemnation by adjoining municipal-
ities and determine the rights of the parties 
from the date of filing. 
Noting that the precedents cited do not 
address the issue of intangible property, 
the court was nonetheless persuaded that 
the statutory framework provided by the 
Maryland Legislature makes clear that 
"until the condemning authority pays just 
compensation, no right to possession is ob-
tained." Colts, 624 F. Supp. at 283. 
Accepting arguendo, the application of 
the "relation back doctrine" to the instant 
case, the court next addressed the issue of 
the appropriate standard for determining 
situs of an intangible, and three standards 
were offered. 
First, as the city urged, the power of em-
inent domain is co-extensive with personal 
jurisdiction and therefore the appropriate 
standard is the "minimum contacts" analy-
sis established by the Supreme Court in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945). However, such a standard 
would be unworkable in view of the re-
quirement that a state's power of eminent 
domain must be exclusive of another state's 
power. 
Highly analogous to condemnation, es-
cheat proceedings often involve determin-
ing the situs of intangible property. In 
such a proceeding, the state takes title to 
property abandoned by its owner. In the 
late 1940's, the courts utilized the "mini-
mum contacts" analysis to determine situs. 
See Connecticut Mutual LIfe Insurance Co. v. 
Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Standard Oil 
v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951). Later 
cases abandoned this analysis in favor of a 
variation of the concept of mobilia sequuntur 
personam (moveables follow the person) 
known as the "last known address" rule. 
Thus, for escheat purposes, the situs of in-
tangibles is determined by the last known 
domicile of the owner. This rule however, 
proves to be unworkable as applied to con-
demnation proceedings. "Unlike escheat 
proceedings, where the location of the 
owner is usually unknown, condemnation 
simply requires the court to determine 
where, among two or more possible choices, 
the property was located on a given date." 
Colts, 624 F. Supp. at 287. 
The standard to determine situs in City 
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 183 Cal. 
Rptr. 673, rested on three factors: the prin-
ciple place of business; the designated NFL 
authorized site for the team's home games; 
and the primary locale for the team's tan-
gible property. Id. 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682. 
Applying a similar analysis to the instant 
case, the court set out three factors which 
it had found determinative that the Colts 
were not in Maryland on March 30, 1984. 
First, the principle place of business was 
not in Maryland as no further day-to-day 
business was conducted in Maryland after 
March 28. Second, the team's essential 
tangible property was in Indianapolis by 
March 30, 1984. Finally, it was Irsay's in-
tention that the Colts would be outside the 
jurisdiction by the time any eminent do-
main action was filed. Colts, 624 F. Supp. 
at 289. 
Although this analysis provides an un-
clear framework to be applied in other con-
demnation proceedings, the court clearly 
requires the condemning authority to have 
substantial contacts with the intangible 
property before that sovereign's territory 
will be deemed as the situs. 
The use of eminent domain is restrained 
by the requirements of public use and just 
compensation. The city's failure to pay just 
compensation at a time when the franchise 
was located in Maryland obviated the need 
for the court to test the basic underlying 
assumption upon which their decision 
rests. This assumption is that the acquisi-
tion of a professional sports franchise con-
stitutes a valid public use. 
Maryland has evidenced a clear intent 
not to limit the public use doctrine to the 
narrow interpretation that a "public use" 
means ''use by the public." See Marchant v. 
Baltimore, 146 Md. 573, 126 A. 884(1924); 
Pt;ince Georges County v. Collington Cross-
roads, 275 Md. 171,339 A.2d 278 (1975) 
(For case law supporting the narrow in-
terpretation see Karesh v. City Council, 
271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E. 2d 342 (1978». 
However, acceptance of Emergency Bill 
No. 1042 and of the views expressed in 
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 673, constitute an unwarranted 
and substantial expansion of a sovereign's 
power to condemn. The court's decision 
implicitly expands the notion of public 
use to such an extent that it has become a 
meaningless restraint upon the application 
of eminent domain. 
What then are the implications of a power 
so broad as to enable a sovereign to con-
demn a viable business and justify their 
taking upon an obscure belief that they are 
indirectly benefiting the public? Indeed, no 
one knows where the line is now drawn but 
such an unprecedented expansion strikes at 
the very heart of our basic property rights 
inherent in the United States Constitution. 
Until the legislature or the judiciary takes 
responsibility for establishing guidelines 
and limitations, these rights remain ex-
tremely vulnerable. 
- Thomas J. Drechsler 
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